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Abstract
We are witnessing an increasing use of data-driven predictive models to inform
decisions. As decisions have implications for individuals and society, there is
increasing pressure on decision makers to be transparent about their decision
policies, models, and the features they use. At the same time, individuals may
use knowledge, gained by transparency, to invest effort strategically in order to
maximize their chances of receiving a beneficial decision. In this paper, our goal is
to find decision policies that are optimal in terms of utility in such a strategic setting.
To this end, we first use the theory of optimal transport to characterize how strategic
investment of effort by individuals leads to a change in the feature distribution at
a population level. Then, we show that, in contrast with the non-strategic setting,
optimal decision policies are stochastic, and we cannot expect to find them in
polynomial time. Finally, we derive an efficient greedy algorithm that is guaranteed
to find locally optimal decision policies in polynomial time. Experiments on
synthetic and real lending data illustrate our theoretical findings and show that
the decision policies found by our greedy algorithm achieve higher utility than
deterministic threshold rules, which are optimal policies in a non-strategic setting.
1 Introduction
Consequential decisions across a wide variety of domains, from hiring and banking to the judiciary,
are increasingly informed by data-driven predictive models. In all these domains, the decision maker
aims to employ a decision policy that maximizes a given utility function while the predictive model
aims to provide an accurate prediction of the outcome of the process from a set of observable features.
For example, in loan decisions, a bank may decide whether or not to offer a loan to an applicant on
the basis of a predictive model’s estimate of the probability that the individual would repay the loan.
In this context, there is an increasing pressure on the decision makers to be transparent about the
decision policies, the predictive models, and the features they use. However, individuals are incenti-
vized to use this knowledge to invest effort strategically in order to receive a beneficial decision. With
this motivation, there has been a recent flurry of work on strategic classification [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 16].
This line of work has focused on the development of accurate predictive models and it has shown that,
under certain technical conditions, it is possible to protect predictive models against misclassification
errors that would have resulted from this strategic behavior. In this work, rather than accurate
predictive models, we pursue the development of decision policies that maximize utility in this
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strategic setting. The work most closely related to ours is by Kleinberg and Raghavan [14], which
also considers the design of decision policies in a strategic setting, however, their problem formulation
and assumptions are fundamentally different and their technical contributions are orthogonal to ours.
More broadly, our work also relates to several recent studies on the long-term consequences of
machine learning algorithms [10, 15, 17, 21] and recommender systems [19, 20].
Once we focus on the utility of a decision policy, it is overly pessimistic to always view an individual’s
strategic effort as some form of gaming, and thus undesirable—an individual’s effort in changing
their features may actually lead sometimes to self-improvement, as noted by several studies in the
economic literature [3, 7, 10] and, more recently, in the theoretical computer science literature [14].
For example, in car insurance decisions, if an insurance company uses the number of speeding tickets
a driver receives to decide how much to charge the driver, she may feel compelled to drive more
carefully to pay a lower price, and this will likely make her a better driver. In loan decisions, if
a bank uses credit card debt to decide about the interest rate it offers to a customer, she may feel
compelled to avoid credit card debt overall to pay less interest, and this will improve her financial
situation. In hiring decisions, if a law firm uses the number of internships to decide whether to offer
a job to an applicant, she may feel compelled to do more internships during her studies to increase
their chances of getting hired, and this will improve her job performance. In all these scenarios,
the decision maker—insurance company, bank, or law firm—would like to find a decision policy
that incentivize individuals to invest in forms of effort that increase the utility of the policy—reduce
payouts, default rates, or increase job performance.
We cast the above problem as a Stackelberg game in which the decision maker moves first and shares
her decision policy before individuals best-respond and invest effort to maximize their chances of
receiving a beneficial decision under the policy. Then, we characterize how this strategic investment
of effort leads to a change in the feature distribution at a population level. More specifically, we
derive an analytical expression for the feature distribution induced by any policy in terms of the
original feature distribution by solving an optimal transport problem [23]. Based on this analytical
expression, we make the following contributions:
I. We show that the optimal decision policies are stochastic. This is in contrast with the non-
strategic setting where deterministic threshold rules are optimal [4, 22].
II. We show that the problem of finding the optimal decision policies is NP-hard by using a novel
reduction to the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem [12].
III. We introduce an efficient greedy algorithm (refer to Algorithm 1) that is guaranteed to find
locally optimal decision policies in polynomial time by solving a sequence of linear programs.
Finally, we perform a variety of experiments using synthetic and real lending data to illustrate the
above theoretical findings and show that the decision policies found by our greedy algorithm achieve
higher utility than deterministic threshold rules1.
2 Decision policies, utilities, and individual benefits
Given an individual with a feature vector x ∈ {1, . . . , n}d and a (ground-truth) label y ∈ {0, 1}, a
decision d(x) ∈ {0, 1} controls whether the label y is realized. As an example, in a loan decision,
the decision specifies whether the individual receives a loan (d(x) = 1) or her application is rejected
(d(x) = 0); the label indicates whether an individual repays the loan (y = 1) or defaults (y = 0) upon
receiving it; and the feature vector may include an individual’s salary, education, or credit history2.
Each decision d(x) is sampled from a decision policy d(x) ∼ pi(d |x) and, for each individual, the
labels y are sampled from P (y |x). Moreover, we adopt a Stackelberg game-theoretic formulation
in which the decision maker publishes her decision policy pi before individuals (best-)respond. As
it will become clearer in the next section, individual best responses lead to a change in the feature
distribution at a population level—we will say that the new feature distribution P (x |pi) is induced
by the policy pi. Then, we measure the (immediate) utility a decision maker obtains using a policy pi
as the average overall profit she obtains [4, 13, 22], i.e.,
u(pi, c) = Ex∼P (x |pi), y∼P (y |x), d∼pi(d |x)[y d(x)− c d(x)]
= Ex∼p(x |pi),d∼pi(d |x)[d(x)(P (y = 1 |x)− c)]. (1)
1We will release an open-source implementation of our greedy algorithm with the final version of the paper.
2For simplicity, we assume features are discrete and, without loss of generality, we assume each feature takes n discrete values.
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where c ∈ (0, 1) is a given constant reflecting economic considerations of the decision maker. For
example, in a loan scenario, the first term is proportional to the expected number of individuals
who receive and repay a loan, the second term is proportional to the number of individuals who
receive a loan, and c measure the cost of offering a loan in units of repaid loans. Finally, we define
the (immediate) individual benefit an individual with features x obtains as the probability that she
receives a beneficial decision, i.e.,
b(x, c) = Ed∼pi(d |x)[f(d(x), c)], (2)
where the function f(·) is problem dependent. For example, in a loan scenario, one may define
f(d(x), c) = 1−d(x) and thus the benefit be proportional to the probability that she receives a loan.
3 Problem Formulation
Similarly as in most previous work in strategic classification [2, 5, 6, 8, 11], we consider a Stackelberg
game in which the decision maker moves first and shares her decision policy before individuals
best-respond3. Moreover, we assume every individual is rational and aims to maximize her individual
benefit. Then, our goal is to find the optimal policy that maximizes utility, as defined in Eq. 1, i.e.,
pi∗ = argmax
pi
u(pi, c), (3)
under the assumption that each individual best responds. For each individual, her best response is to
change from her initial set of features xi to a set of features
xj = argmax
xk
b(xk, c)− c(xi,xk), (4)
where c(xi,xk) is the cost she pays for changing from xi to xk, with c(xi,xi) = 04. At a population
level, this best response results into a transportation of mass between the original distribution and
the induced distribution, i.e., from P (xi) to P (xj |pi). Thus, we can readily derive an analytical
expression for the induced feature distribution in terms of the original feature distribution:
P (xj |pi) =
∑
xi
P (xi)I(xj = argmax
xk
b(xk, c)− c(xi,xk)). (5)
Note that the transportation of mass between the original and the induced feature distribution has a
natural interpretation in terms of optimal transport theory [23]. More specifically, the induced feature
distribution is given by P (xj |pi) =
∑
i fij , where fij denotes the flow between P (xi) and P (xj |pi)
and it is the solution to the following optimal transport problem:
maximize
{fij}
∑
i,j
fij [b(xj , c)− c(xi,xj)]
subject to fij ≥ 0 ∀i, j and
∑
j
fij = P (xi).
(6)
Finally, we can combine Eqs. 3-5 and rewrite our goal as follows:
pi∗ = argmax
pi
∑
i,j
[(P (y = 1 |xj)− c)pi(xj)]
[
P (xi)I(xj = argmax
xk
b(xk, c)− c(xi,xk))
]
(7)
where note that, by definition, 0 ≤ pi(xj) ≤ 1 for all j and, in practice, the distribution P (x) and the
conditional distribution P (y |x) may be approximated using models trained on historical data.
4 Optimal Decision Policies are Stochastic and Hard to Find
In this section, we first show that, in contrast with the non-strategic setting, optimal decision policies
that maximize utility in a strategic setting are stochastic. Then, we demonstrate that we cannot expect
to find these optimal decision policies in polynomial time.
3In previous work, the predictive model, rather than the decision policy, is what the decision maker shares.
4Note that, in contrast with previous work, we do not make any additional assumption regarding the properties of the cost.
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Optimal policies in a strategic setting are stochastic. In a non-strategic setting where P (x |pi) =
P (x), it has been shown that, under perfect knowledge of the conditional distribution P (y |x), the
optimal policy that maximizes utility is a simple deterministic threshold rule [4, 22], i.e.,
pi∗(d = 1 |x) =
{
1 if P (y = 1 |x) ≥ c
0 otherwise.
(8)
This has lent support to focusing on deterministic threshold policies and has seemingly justified using
predictions and decisions interchangeably. However, in a strategic setting, there are many instances
in which that does not hold true. For example, assume x ∈ {1, 2, 3} with c = 0.2,
P (x) =

0.2 if x = 1
0.3 if x = 2
0.5 if x = 3,
P (y = 1 |x) =

1 if x = 1
0.6 if x = 2
0.1 if x = 3,
c(xi,xj) =
[
0.0 1.2 0.8
1.2 0.0 0.4
0.8 0.4 0.0
]
In the non-strategic setting, the optimal policy is clearly pi∗(d = 1 |x = 1) = 1, pi∗(d = 1 |x =
2) = 1 and pi∗(d = 1 |x = 2) = 0. However, in the strategic setting, a brute force search
reveals that the optimal policy is given by pi∗(d = 1 |x = 1) = 1, pi∗(d = 1 |x = 2) = 0.6 and
pi∗(d = 1 |x = 2) = 0, and it induces a transportation of mass from P (x = 3) to P (x = 1 |pi).
Here, note that the optimal policy in the strategic setting achieves a higher utility than its counterpart
in the non-strategic setting. Unfortunately, we will now show that any algorithm that finds the optimal
policy in a strategic setting, including brute force, will have exponential complexity unless P = NP.
Hardness results. Our main result is the following Theorem, which shows that we cannot expect to
find the optimal policy that maximizes utility in polynomial time:
Theorem 1. The problem of finding the optimal decision that maximizes utility in a strategic setting
is NP-hard.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume each individual has one single feature x, which can take n
values. First, we start by representing the problem using a directed weighted bipartite graph, whose
nodes can be divided into two disjoint sets U and V . In each of these sets, there are n nodes with
labels {x1, . . . , xn}. Moreover, we characterize each node xi in U with P (xi) and each node xj in V
with pi(xj) and u(xj). Then, we connect each node xi in U to each node xj in V and set each edge
weight to w(xi, xj) = pi(xj)− c(xi, xj). Now, for each node xi in U , only the edge with maximum
weight will have nonzero utility, i.e.,
u(xi, xj) = pi(xj)u(xj)P (xi)I(xj = argmax
xk
w(xi, xk))
Under this representation, the problem reduces to finding the values of pi(xj) such that the sum of the
utilities of all edges in the graph is maximized.
Next, we will reduce the problem to the SAT problem [12], which is known to be NP-complete.
In a SAT problem, the goal is finding the value of a set of boolean variables {y1, y2, . . . , yn}, and
their logical complements {y¯1, y¯2, . . . , y¯n}, that satisfy s number of OR clauses, which we label
as {k1, k2, . . . , ks}. More specifically, we start by introducing another directed weighted bipartite
graph, whose nodes can be also divided into two disjoint sets U and V . The set U contains 3n+ s
nodes with labels
{z11, . . . , z1n, z21, . . . , z2n, z31, . . . , z3n, k1, k2, . . . , ks}
and the set V contains 4n nodes with labels
{y1, . . . , yn, y¯1, . . . , y¯n, a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn}.
For the set U , we characterize each node u with P (u), where
P (z1i) =
3(s+ 1)
3n+ 3(s+ 1)n
, P (z2i) = P (z3i) =
1
3n+ 3(s+ 1)n
and P (kl) =
1
3n+ 3(s+ 1)n
for all i = 1, . . . , n and l = 1, . . . , s. For the set V , we characterize each node v with pi(v) and u(v),
where
u(yi) = u(y¯1) = 1 and u(ai) = u(bi) = 2(s+ 1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then, we connect each node u in U to each node v in V and set each edge
weights to w(u, v) = pi(v)− c(u, v), where:
4
Algorithm 1 GREEDYPOLICY: It approximates the optimal decision policy that maximize utility
under the assumption that the individuals best respond.
Require: Constant c, distribution P = [P (xi)], and cost C = [c(xi,xj)]
1: pi ← INITIALIZEPOLICY()
2: do
3: pi′ ← pi
4: for i = 1, . . . , nd do
5: pi′′ ← SOLVE(x(i), pi,D, P )
6: pi(x(i)) = pi′′(x(i))
7: end for
8: while pi 6= pi′
9: return pi′, u(pi′, c)
(i) c(z1i, yj) = c(z1i, y¯j) = 0 and c(z2i, yj) = c(z3i, yj) = c(kl, yj) = c(z2i, y¯j) = c(z3i, y¯j) =
c(kl, y¯j) = 2 for each i, j = 1, . . . , n and l = 1, . . . , s.
(ii) c(z2i, yj) = 0, c(z2i, aj) = 1 −  and c(z1i, yj) = c(z3i, yj) = c(kl, yj) = c(z1i, aj) =
c(z3i, aj) = c(kl, aj) = 2 for each i, j = 1, . . . , n and l = 1, . . . , s.
(iii) c(z3i, y¯j) = 0, c(z3i, bj) = 1 −  and c(z1i, y¯j) = c(z2i, y¯j) = c(kl, y¯j) = c(z1i, bj) =
c(z2i, bj) = c(kl, bj) = 2 for each i, j = 1, . . . , n and l = 1, . . . , s.
(iv) c(ki, yj) = 0 if the clause ki contains yj , c(ki, y¯j) = 0 if the clause ki contains y¯j , and
c(ki, aj) = c(ki, bj) = 2 for all i = 1, . . . , s and j = 1, . . . , n.
Similarly as before, for each node u in U , only the edge with the maximum weight will have nonzero
utility, i.e.,
u(u, v) = pi(v)u(v)P (u)I(v = argmax
w
w(u,w))
Now, note that, under the above definition of utilities and costs, finding the optimal values of pi(v)
such that the sum of the utilities of all edges in the graph is maximized reduces to first solving n
independent problems, one per pair yj and y¯j , since whenever c(u, v) = 2, the edge will never be
active, and each optimal pi value will be always either zero or one. Moreover, the maximum utility
due to the nodes kz will be always smaller than the utility due to yj and y¯j and we can exclude them
by the moment. In the following, we fix j and compute the sum of utilities for all possible values of
yj and y¯j :
• For pi(yj) = pi(y¯j) = 0, the maximum sum of utilities is 4(s+1)3n+3(s+1)n whenever pi(aj) =
pi(bj) = 1.
• For pi(yj) = pi(y¯j) = 1, the sum of utilities is 3(s+1)+23n+3(s+1)n for any value of pi(aj) and pi(bj).
• For pi(yj) = 1− pi(y¯j), the maximum sum of utilities is 5(s+1)3n+3(s+1)n .
Therefore, the maximum sum of utilities 5(s+1)3+3(s+1) occurs whenever pi(yj) = 1 − pi(y¯j) for all
j = 1, . . . , n. Finally, to find the actual values of pi(yj) and pi(y¯j) that maximize the overall utility,
including the utility due to the nodes kz , we will need to solve the SAT problem with pi(yj) = yj and
pi(y¯j) = y¯j . This concludes the proof.
5 A Greedy Algorithm with Local Guarantees
In this section, we first introduce an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate the optimal decision
policy that maximizes utility under the assumption that the individuals best respond, given by Eq. 7.
Then, we prove that this greedy algorithm is guaranteed to terminate and find locally optimal decision
policies. Finally, we propose a variation of the greedy algorithm that is amenable to parallelization
(but does not enjoy theoretical guarantees).
A greedy algorithm. The greedy algorithm is based on the following key insight: fix the decision
policy pi(x) for all feature values x = xk except x = xi. Then, Eq. 7 becomes a linear program in
pi(xi), which can be solved efficiently using well-known techniques.
Exploiting this insight, the greedy algorithm proceeds iteratively over feature values xi and, at
each iteration, it optimizes the decision policy for one feature value while fixing the decision
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Figure 1: Optimal decision policies and induced feature distributions. Panels (a) and (b) visualize
P (x) and P (y = 1 |x), respectively. Panels (c-h) visualize P (x |pi) and pi(x) for different values of
the parameter α, which control the cost to change feature values c(xi,xj). In all panels, each cell
corresponds to a different feature value xi and darker colors correspond to higher values.
policy for all other values. Algorithm 1 summarizes the greedy algorithm. Within the algorithm,
INITIALIZEPOLICY() initializes the decision policy to pi(x) = 0 for all x, x(i) denotes the i-th
feature value in terms of utility pi(x(i)), SOLVE(x, pi,C,P ) finds the best policy pi(x) for x given
pi(xk) for all xk 6= x, C = [c(xi,xj)] and P = [P (xi)]. Note that we proceed over feature values
according to their utility value because, in practice, we have observed that such ordering improves
performance. However, our theoretical results do not depend on such ordering.
Theoretical guarantees of the greedy algorithm. We start our theoretical analysis by showing that,
at each iteration, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to find a better policy:
Proposition 2. At each iteration, Algorithm 1 finds a better policy pi, i.e., u(pi, c) > u(pi′, c).
Proof. It readily follows from the fact that the linear program always returns a better policy pi and by
definition, at the end of each iteration, pi 6= pi′.
Moreover, the following Proposition shows that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to terminate:
Proposition 3. Algorithm 1 terminates after at most nd(1+ 1u¯ ) − 1 iterations, where u¯ is the common
denominator of all elements in the set A = {c(xi,xj)− c(xi,xk) |xi,xj ,xk ∈ {1, . . . , n}d}∪ 15.
Proof. We prove that u¯ is a denominator of pi(xj) ∀xj ∈ {1, . . . , n}d after each update in the
greedy algorithm. We prove this claim by induction. The induction basis is obvious as we initialize
the values of pi(xj) = 0 for all xj . For the induction step, suppose that we are going to update
pi(xj) in our greedy algorithm. According to the induction hypothesis we know that
pi(xk)
u¯ ∈ Z
∀xk ∈ {1, . . . , n}d. Then, it can be shown that the new value of pi(xj) will be chosen among the
elements of the following set (these are the thresholds that might change the transfer of masses):
pinew(xj) ∈ {0} ∪ {1} ∪
{
maxk(pi(xk)− c(xi,xk)) + c(xi,xj) |xi ∈ {0, . . . , n}d}
}
(9)
In the above, it is clear that all these possible values are divisible by u¯, so the new value of pi(xj)
will be divisible by u¯ too. Then, since 0 ≤ pi(xj) ≤ 1 and pi(xj)u¯ ∈ Z for all xj ∈ {1, . . . , n}d,
there are 1 + 1u¯ possible values for each pi(xj), i.e., 0, u¯, 2u¯, . . . , 1. As a result, there are n
d(1+ 1u¯ )
different decision policies pi. Finally, since the total utility increases after each iteration, as shown in
Proposition 2, the decision policy pi at each iteration must be different. As a result, the algorithm will
terminate after at most nd(1+
1
u¯ ) − 1 iteration.
5The common denominator u¯ satisfies that au¯ ∈ Z ∀a ∈ A ∪ {1}. Such u¯ exists if and only if ab is rational ∀a, b ∈ A.
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Figure 2: Performance and running time using synthetic data. Panels (a) and (b) shows the utility
achieved by four different decision policies against the parameter κ and number of feature values n,
respectively. Panel (c) shows the running time of the greedy algorithm, the parallel greedy algorithm
and brute force search. In Panel (a), we set n = 200 and, in Panels (b) and (c), we set κ = 0.75.
Finally, as a direct consequence of both propositions, we can conclude that Algorithm 1 finds locally
optimal decision policies.
A parallel greedy algorithm. Whenever n and d are large, the greedy algorithm may still suffer
from scalability problems. In those cases, we can substitute line 5 in Algorithm 1 by pi′′ ←
SOLVE(x(i), pi
′, D, P ) to be able to solve nd linear programs, one per feature value, in parallel. While
the resulting algorithm does not enjoy theoretical guarantees, it achieves comparable performance in
terms of utility, as shown in Figure 2.
6 Experiments on Synthetic Data
Structure of decision policies and induced distributions. In this section, we look at a particular
configuration, however, we found qualitative similar results across many different configurations.
More specifically, we consider 2-dimensional features and compute P (x), shown in Figure 1(a), by
discretizing a two-dimensional Gaussian mixture model ρN(µ1,Σ)+(1−ρ)N(µ2,Σ), where µ1 =
[4, 4],µ2 = [7, 10], Σ = I , and ρ = 0.5, into a 7×7 grid with x1 ∈ [2, 3] and x2 ∈ [3, 14]. Moreover,
for simplicity, we rescale x1 and x2 so that x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 6}. Then, we compute P (y = 1 |x),
shown in Figure 1(b), using the expression p(y = 1 |x) = (|x1|+ |3−x2|)/24+(|x1|+ |7−x2|)/24.
Finally, we set c(xi,xj) = 1α [|xi0 − xj0|+ |xi1 − xj1|], where α is a given parameter6, and c = 0.2.
Given the above configuration, we obtain a locally optimal decision policy pi(x) using Algorithm 1
and, given this policy, compute its induced distribution P (x |pi) using Eq. 5. Figure 1(c-h) summarize
the results for several values of α, which show that, as the cost of moving to further feature values for
individuals decrease, the decision policy only provides positive decisions for a few x values with
high (P (y = 1 |x)− c), encouraging individuals to move to those values. Appendix A.1 contains
another example showing a qualitatively similar behavior.
Performance evaluation. We compare the utility achieved by the decision policy found by the
greedy algorithm against the utility achieved by: (i) the decision policy found by the parallel greedy
algorithm; (ii) the optimal decision policy in a non-strategic setting; (iii) and, a deterministic decision
policy pid(x) obtained by thresholding the decision policy found by our algorithm, i.e., pid(x) =
I(pi(x) ≥ 0.5), where pi(x) is the decision policy found by our algorithm. For the parallel greedy
algorithm, we run it using 40 parallel threads. Here, for simplicity, we consider a unidimensional
features with n discrete values x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and compute P (x = i) = pi/
∑
j pj , where pi
is sampled from a Gaussian distribution N(µ = 0.5, σ = 0.1) truncated from below at zero. Then,
we sample P (y = 1 |x) ∼ U [0, 1], sample the cost between feature values c(xi,xj) ∼ U [0, 1] for a
fraction κ of all pairs and set c(xi,xj) =∞ for the remaining pairs, and set c = 0.3.
Figures 2(a,b) summarize the results for several sparsity levels κ and number of feature values n,
where we repeat each experiment 8 times to obtain error bars. We find that, in comparison with the
decision policies designed for strategic settings, the optimal decision policy in a non-strategic setting
achieves an underwhelming performance.
Running time. We compare the running time of the greedy algorithm, the parallel greedy algorithm
and brute force search7. We consider the same configuration as in the performance evaluation and
6The larger the value of α, the easier it becomes for an individual to change features
7We ran all experiments on a machine equipped with 48 Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.00GHz CPU cores and 1.2TB memory.
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Figure 3: Results on LendingClub data. Panel (a) shows the utility achieved by four different
decision policies. Panel (b) shows the transportation of mass in the feature distribution induced by
the decision policy found by the greedy algorithm. Panel (c) shows the feature distribution P (x)
and the distribution P (x |pi) induced by the decision policy found by the greedy algorithm for three
different values of α.
an increasing number of feature values n. Figure 2(c) summarizes the results, which show that: (i)
brute force search quickly becomes computationally intractable and (ii) the greedy algorithm is faster
than the parallel greedy algorithm for a small number of feature values, due to its lower number of
iterations until termination, however, the parallel greedy algorithm becomes more scalable for large
number of feature values. Appendix A.2 shows the number of iterations the greedy algorithm and the
parallel greedy algorithm take to terminate.
7 Experiments on Real Data
Experimental setup. We use a publicly available lending dataset8, which comprises of information
about all accepted and rejected loan applications in LendingClub from 2007 and 2018. For each
application, the dataset contains various demographic features about the applicant. In addition, for
each accepted application, it contains the current loan status (e.g., Current, Late, Fully Paid), the
latest payment information, and the FICO scores.
In our experiment, we first use the information about accepted applications to train a decision tree
classifier (DTC) with n = 200 leaves. This classifier predicts whether an applicant fully pays a loan
(y = 1) or defaults/has a charged-off debt (y = 0) on the basis of a set of raw features, i.e., the
loan amount, employment length, state, debt to income ratio, zip code and credit score (Appendix B
provides more information about the raw features). The classifier achieves a 90% accuracy, as
estimated using 3-fold cross-validation. Then, for each (accepted or rejected) application, we set its
unidimensional feature x to be the leaf of the DTC where the application is mapped into, given the
raw features, and we approximate the conditional probability P (y = 1 |x) using the prediction of
the DTC for the corresponding leaf. Then, we compute the cost between feature values c(xi,xj) by
comparing the raw features of the applications mapped to each leaf of the DTC, where we apply a
scaling factor 1/α similarly as in the experiments on synthetic data (Appendix B.1 provides more
information on the computation of c(xi,xj)). Finally, we compute the cost of giving a loan c = 0.42
to the 70-th percentile of the P (y = 1 |x) value for applicants who defaults/has a charged-off debt.
Results. Figure 3(a) summarizes the results. As α increases and the cost of moving to further values
for individuals decreases, we find that: (i) the decision policies found by the greedy and parallel
greedy algorithms outperform the deterministic policy pid(x) derived from the decision policy found
by the greedy algorithm and the optimal policy in a non-strategic setting by large margins (Panel (a));
(ii) there is a higher transportation of mass between the original feature distribution P (x) and the
distribution P (x |pi) induced by the decision policy found by the greedy algorithm (Panel (b)); and,
(iii) the probability mass in P (x |pi) becomes more concentrated (Panel (c)).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the problem of finding optimal decision policies that maximize utility
in a strategic setting. We have shown that, in contrast with the non-strategic setting, optimal decision
policies that maximize utility are stochastic and hard to find. Moreover, we have proposed an efficient
greedy algorithm that is guaranteed to find locally optimal decision policies in polynomial time and
demonstrated its efficacy using both synthetic and real data.
8https://www.kaggle.com/wordsforthewise/lending-club/version/3
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Our work opens up many interesting avenues for future work. Our greedy algorithm enjoys local
performance guarantees. It would be interesting to develop algorithms with global performance
guarantees. Moreover, we have assumed that features take discrete values. It would be very interesting
to extend our work to real valued features. Our problem formulation considers policies that maximize
utility. A natural step would be considering utility maximization under fairness constraints [9, 24]. In
our work, the individuals have white-box access to the decision policy, however, in practice, they
may only have access to explanations of specific outcomes. Finally, there are reasons to believe that
causal features should be more robust to strategic behavior. It would be interesting to investigate the
use of causally aware feature selection methods [18] in strategic settings.
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A Additional experiments on synthetic data
A.1 Structure of decision policies and induced distributions
We consider 2-dimensional features, define the cost between feature values xi and xj as 1α [|xi0 −
xj0|+|xi1−xj1|], where α is a given parameter9, and set c = 0.2. Moreover, to compute P (x), shown
in Figure 4(a), we discretize a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution N(µ,Σ), where µ = [2.5, 2.5]
and Σ = 1.4I into a 7× 7 grid with x1 ∈ [−3, 6.3] and x2 ∈ [−1, 7.5] and, for simplicity, rescale
x1 and x2 so that x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 6}. To compute P (y = 1 |x), shown in Figure 4(b), we use the
expression p(y = 1 |x) = max((x1 +x2)/12, (|6−x1|+ |6−x2|)/12). Here, note that, in contrast
with the example in Figure 1 in the main paper, P (x) is unimodal and P (y = 1 |x) is bimodal.
Given the above configuration, we obtain a locally optimal decision policy pi(x) using Algorithm 1
and, given this policy, compute its induced distribution P (x |pi) using Eq. 5. Figure 4(c-h) summarize
the results for several values of α, which are in qualitative agreement with the example shown in
Figure 1 in the main paper—as the cost of moving to further feature values for individuals decrease,
the decision policy only provides positive decisions for a few x values with high (P (y = 1 |x)− c),
encouraging individuals to move to those values.
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Figure 4: Optimal decision policies and induced feature distributions. Panels (a) and (b) visualize
P (x) and P (y = 1 |x), respectively. Panels (c-h) visualize P (x |pi) and pi(x) for different values of
the parameter α, which control the cost to change feature values c(xi,xj). In all panels, each cell
corresponds to a different feature value xi and darker colors correspond to higher values.
A.2 Number of iterations to termination
Figure 5 shows the number of iterations the greedy algorithm and the parallel greedy algorithm take
to terminate against the number of feature values n, where we consider the same configuration as
in the running time evaluation. Here, note that the parallel greedy algorithm does not enjoy the
same theoretical guarantees as the greedy algorithm and thus it may not always converge. In our
experiments, we set a limit of 20 iterations for the parallel greedy algorithm and, in fact, we do
reach that limit sometimes. Finally, although the parallel greedy algorithm takes more iterations to
terminate, thanks to parallelization, it is more scalable for large number of feature values.
B Additional details on the experiments on real data
B.1 Computation of the cost between feature values
To compute the cost between feature values c(xi,xj), we compare the raw features (refer to Ap-
pendix B.2) of the applications mapped to each leave of the decision tree classifier (DTC). More
9The larger the value of α, the easier it becomes for an individual to change features
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Figure 5: Number of iterations the greedy algorithm and the parallel greedy algorithm take to
terminate against the number of feature values n
specifically, for each leaf xi of the DTC, we consider the concatenation of the state code and partial
zip code data (which we called state-zip), the debt to income ratio and the employment length of
each applicant mapped into the leaf xi. Then, given a pair of leafs xi and xj , we compute the cost
c(xi,xj) as the sum of three terms:
(i) The ratio of unique values of state-zip for applicants mapped into leaf xj that no applicant
mapped into leaf xi has. This term is weighted by 0.25.
(ii) The difference between the average debt to income ratios of applicants mapped into leaf xi and
leaf xj , where we set all negative differences to zero, we normalize the resulting differences by
the 50-th percentile of debt to income values, and we cap the values to be equal or less than
1. This follows the intuition that it is more costly to move from a leaf with a higher value of
average debt to income ratio to a leaf with a lower value. This term is weighted by 0.5.
(iii) The difference between the average employment lengths of applicants mapped into leaf xj and
leaf xi, where we set all negative differences to zero, we normalize the resulting differences to
lie between 0 and 1. This follows the intuition that it is more costly to move from a leaf with a
lower value of employment length to a leaf with a higher value. This term is weighted by 0.25.
B.2 Raw features
The decision tree classifier (DTC) predicts whether an applicant fully pays a loan (y = 1) or
defaults/charged off (y = 0) based on the following raw features:
• Loan Amount: The amount that the applicant initially requested.
• Employment Length: How long the applicant has been employed.
• State: The state where the applicant lives inside the United States of America.
• Debt to Income Ratio: The ratio between the applicant’s financial debts and her average income.
• Zip Code: The zip code of the applicant’s residential address.
• FICO Score: The applicant’s FICO score, which is a credit score based on consumer credit files.
The FICO scores are in the range of 300-850 and the average of the high and low range for the
FICO score of each applicant has been used for this study.
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